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aBstraCt
In this article I analyse how evidence influences, determines and evaluates belief  
formation. I deal with the main normative accounts and with constitutive non-
normative accounts of  the evidential thesis for belief  emergence and I finally defend 
that evidentialism must be understood in constitutive non-normative terms. More 
specifically, evidentialism must be based on the idea that believers always consider that 
they have enough evidence for their beliefs.
KEyWords: Normativity, evidentialism, reasons for belief, wishful thinking, belief  
emergence.
rEsuMEn
En este artículo analizo cómo la evidencia influye, determina y evalúa la formación 
de la creencia. Trato las principales visiones normativas y constitutivas no normativas 
sobre la tesis evidencialista para la emergencia de creencias y finalmente defiendo que 
el evidencialismo debe ser entendido en términos constitutivos no normativos. Más 
específicamente, el evidencialismo debe basarse en la idea de que los creyentes siem-
pre consideran que tienen suficiente evidencia para sus creencias.
PaLaBras CLavE: Normatividad, evidencialismo, razones para la creencia, wishful 
thinking, creación de las creencias.
1. introduCtion
Evidentialist philosophers defend that evidence is mandatory for belief  
formation (Whiting 2014, Adler & Hicks) while non-evidentialist philosophers 
support that sometimes beliefs may emerge without the need of  evidence (Reisner, 
Rinard). Evidentialists usually defend that evidence is the only reason for belief  
emergence: agents form beliefs because they receive evidential in-puts. Non-
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evidentialists usually admit a broader range of  possibilities. What I here call the 
evidentialist thesis establishes that evidence is a necessary reason for belief  formation. 
The amount and quality of  evidence sufficient to develop beliefs are other hot spots 
of  the debate.
In this work I analyse what evidentialism for belief  emergence means. However, 
I do not adopt any specific position on the evidentialism vs. non-evidentialism 
debate. For that, in section 2 I deal with the main normative approaches to 
evidentialism — believers should believe p if  and only if  there is (enough) 
evidence to believe p- and I argue that an evaluative normative characterization 
of  evidentialism may allow for “incorrect” non-evidential reasons for belief  
emergence, something that a pure evidentialist position does not allow. In section 
3 I deal with the main non-normative account of  evidentialism — believers 
believe p if  and only if  there is (enough) evidence to believe p. I argue that a 
constitutive non-normative characterization of  evidentialism does not allow for 
beliefs emerged according to non-evidential reasons, but at the same time it may 
admit different standard of  correctness to judge already formed beliefs. In section 
4 I finally defend that the evidentialist position must be described in constitutive 
non-normative terms according to a minimum amount of  evidence as the reason 
for belief  formation. Such minimum amount of  evidence is established by the 
very believer: believers believe p if  and only if  believers consider that they have 
enough evidence to believe p. Finally, in section 5 I sum up this work.
To exemplify the different approaches I focus on wishful thinking cases, 
which are usually labelled as beliefs. Wishful thinking cases are very suggesting for 
this analysis, as they work as beliefs based or emerged according to weak or no 
evidence. More specifically, I continuously refer to the James’ love case:
(James’ love case) James is in love with Olga and he is convinced that it is a requited 
love. Olga does not love James, and she tells him. Furthermore, James’ friends 
try to convince him showing opposite evidence and James has himself  seen Olga 
dating another boy many times. But it does not matter: for James, Olga is just 
playing hardball with him. James believes Olga loves him too.
In this case, James develop his belief  against the most reliable available 
evidence given by his friends and by Olga herself. Broadly put, pure evidentialist 
philosophers defend that James developed his false belief  due to — defective- 
evidence even if  other conative or pragmatic features may have influenced such 
belief  emergence. Normative evidentialist philosophers focus on the incorrectness 
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of  James’ belief. Non-evidentialist philosophers may say that in some cases, like 
the James’ love case, beliefs may emerge without any evidential reason.
Other similar wishful thinking cases are the football team supporter who 
believes that his team is going to win the next match although most of  the 
available and reliable evidence shows the opposite, or the mother of  a criminal 
who believes that her son is innocent despite the fact that most available and 
reliable evidence shows the opposite.
2. norMativE aCCounts oF thE EvidEntiaList thEsis
(i) For an agent S and a proposition p, S should believe p if  and only if  there is 
evidence to believe p.
This is the most demanding account for the defence of  evidential reasons for 
belief  formation. First, the implication ‘if  there is evidence to believe p, then S 
should believe p’ forces the agent to develop beliefs for every available piece of  
evidence. But many pieces of  evidence are continuously available, the agent is not 
able to continuously develop the correspondent beliefs and sometimes pieces of  
evidence are contradictory.
Second, the implication ‘if  S should believe p, then there is evidence to believe 
p’1 establishes an epistemic standard of  correctness for beliefs — they are correct 
only if  there is evidence to believe them- but it is far from clear that beliefs may 
be evaluated only according to epistemic terms. And, as said before, there can be 
contradictory evidence when developing a specific belief. In the James’ love case, 
1 If  preferred, ‘S should believe p only if  there is evidence to believe p’ or ‘if  there is not any 
evidence to believe p, then S should not believe p’.
It should be noted that in a broad sense, the latter implication is that ‘if  there is not any 
evidence to believe p, then it it not the case that S should believe p’. But this broad scope allows 
for correct beliefs based on no evidence, something that is not permissible from the normati-
vist evidentialist thesis of  beliefs. For that reason I state a narrow scope of  the implication: ‘if  
there is not any evidence to believe p, then S should not believe p’.
Following Daniel Whiting (2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2014), another possible norm for the evi-
dential thesis on beliefs is that ‘S may believe p if  and only if  there is evidence to believe p’. 
In that way, ‘if  there is not evidence to believe p, then it is not the case that S may believe 
p, so S should not believe p’. At the same time, this normative account solves the problem 
of  developing beliefs for every available piece of  evidence: ‘if  there is evidence to believe p, 
then S may believe p, but she is not forced to do so’. On the contrary, this account does not 
tell how and when evidence enhances belief  formation. It just states possibility conditions for 
belief  emergence. 
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there is evidence to believe that Olga does not love James, then James should 
believe that Olga does not love him. But he does believe that Olga loves him, 
contrary to the most reliable evidence, and even if  the belief  is epistemically 
incorrect, it may psychologically aid James.
The second implication of  this account establishes that if  there is not any 
evidence to believe that Olga loves James, then James should not believe that Olga 
loves him (see footnote 1). But he does believe that Olga loves him, apparently 
with no evidence.
It may be argued that James’ belief  that Olga loves him is incorrect — James 
should not believe so and he should believe that Olga does not love him. But 
such incorrectness is just epistemic. According to other standards of  correctness, 
James’ belief  may be correct — e.g. it provides emotional fitness to him, at least 
in the short run, and this may be useful for him. Moreover, for the evidentialist 
thesis evidence must be a reason for belief  emergence. And in the James’ love case, 
there is a false belief  developed against the most reliable evidence. I will go further 
this issue in sections 3 and 4.
 One possible reformulation of  the normative account of  the evidential thesis 
for belief  formation to solve some of  the previous problems may specify the 
amount of  evidence the agent needs to develop her belief:
(ii) For an agent S and a proposition p, S should believe p if  and only if  there is 
enough evidence to believe p.
First, the implication ‘if  there is enough evidence to believe p, then S should 
believe p’ forces the agent to develop beliefs if  there is enough evidence available. 
It solves the problem of  continuously developing beliefs for every available piece 
of  evidence the previous formulation had. Nevertheless, it does not specify how 
much evidence the agent needs to develop her belief. I will further this issue in 
section 4.
Second, the implication ‘if  S should believe p, then there is enough evidence 
to believe p’2 also establishes an epistemic standard of  correctness for beliefs — 
they are correct only if  there is enough evidence to believe p- but once again it is far 
from clear that beliefs may be evaluated only in epistemic terms.
2 If  preferred, ‘S should believe p only if  there is enough evidence to believe p’ or ‘if  there is 
not enough evidence to believe p, then S should not believe p’. See also footnote 1. 
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If  we apply this normative account of  the evidentialist thesis for belief  
emergence to the James’ love case, first we have that James should believe that Olga 
does not love him if  there is enough evidence to believe that Olga does not love 
James. Actually James’ friends and Olga herself  tell him that she does not love 
him and James has himself  seen Olga dating another guy many times. So it can 
be thought that James really has enough evidence to develop the belief  that Olga 
does not love him. But he does believe that Olga loves him, contrary to what is 
likely to be taken as enough evidence.
Second, if  there is not enough evidence to believe that Olga loves James, 
then James should not believe that Olga loves him (see footnote 1). But he does 
believe that Olga loves him, apparently without having enough available evidence. 
And once again, James’ belief  that Olga loves him is correct from an epistemic 
perspective, but it may be correct from other non-epistemic perspectives.
In short, normative accounts of  evidentialism on beliefs present some 
problems. First, they may force agents to form beliefs for every available piece of  
evidence (i), but this problem can be solved if  the amount of  evidence needed 
for belief  emergence is specified. I reformulate the primitive normative account 
tingeing that enough evidence is needed for belief  emergence (ii) and in section 
4 I will specify how much evidence is “enough”. Second, normative accounts 
judge beliefs only according to epistemic terms, but it may be argued that other 
standards of  correctness are also adequate to judge beliefs — i.e. some false 
beliefs may be correct beliefs for non-epistemic standards of  correctness. Third, 
these normative accounts admit the possibility of  beliefs emerged following no 
evidence even if  they are incorrect — these beliefs are just negatively judged-, 
and this is far from a pure evidentialist thesis for belief  emergence that states that 
evidence is a necessary reason to develop beliefs.
3. non-norMativE aCCounts oF thE EvidEntiaList thEsis
Non-normative accounts of  the evidentialist thesis are broader than the 
previous normative ones. They do not pose any strict norm — should- on 
the relationship between belief  and evidence, but they just establish that such 
relationship is constitutive. In that way, they may admit non-epistemic standard of  
correctness on beliefs but they refuse the possibility of  beliefs emerging following 
no evidence.
(iii) For an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p if  and only if  there is evidence 
to believe p.
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First, the implication ‘if  there is evidence to believe p, then S believes p’ 
establishes that agents develop beliefs for every available piece of  evidence. But 
agents continuously have many available pieces of  evidence and they do not form 
beliefs for all of  them. Furthermore, sometimes these pieces of  evidence are 
contradictory.
Second, the implication ‘if  S believes p, then there is evidence to believe p’3 
refuses the possibility of  forming any belief  following no evidence. Nevertheless, 
such refusal is far from clear and sometimes there may be contradictory evidence 
when developing beliefs.
In the James’ love case, first James has evidence to believe that Olga does not 
love him — friends’ testimonies, James has seen Olga dating another guy many 
times, Olga told James that she does not love him- but James does not believe 
that Olga does not love him. Actually James believes that Olga loves him. This is 
against this account of  evidentialism on beliefs, and the only way of  solving this 
issue is to consider that James has contrary more powerful evidence to believe that 
Olga loves him.
Second, if  James has no evidence to believe that Olga loves him, then he does 
not believe that Olga loves him. But he does believe that Olga loves him. So the 
only way to accommodate James’ love case to this characterization of  the evidential 
thesis for belief  formation is to consider that James has evidence to believe that 
Olga loves him.
As with the previous normative accounts, a possible reformulation of  this 
constitutive account of  the evidential thesis for belief  emergence to solve some 
of  these problems may specify the amount of  evidence the agent needs to develop 
her belief:
(iv) For an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p if  and only if  there is enough 
evidence to believe p.
First, the implication ‘if  there is enough evidence to believe p, then S believes 
p’ establishes that the agent develops her beliefs if  there is enough available evidence. 
It solves the previous problem of  developing beliefs for every available piece of  
evidence. But it does not clarify how much evidence is needed to develop beliefs. 
As I said before, I will further this issue in the next section.
3 If  preferred, ‘S believes p only if  there is evidence to believe p’ or ‘If  there is not any eviden-
ce to believe p, then S does not believe p’. 
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Second, the implication ‘if  S believes p, then there is enough evidence to 
believe p’4 refuses any belief  formed without a minimum amount of  evidence. 
But once again it is far from clear that all beliefs are formed following such a 
minimum amount of  evidence and sometimes there is contradictory evidence for 
belief  emergence.
In the James’ love case, first James seems to have enough evidence to believe 
that Olga does not love him — friends’ testimonies, James has seen Olga dating 
another guy many times, Olga told James that she does not love him-, but James 
does not believe that Olga does not love him. James currently believes that Olga 
loves him. This seems to be against this account of  evidentialism on beliefs. The 
only way of  solving this issue from this account is to consider that James has a 
greater amount of  contrary evidence to believe that Olga loves him.
Second, if  James does not have enough evidence to believe that Olga loves 
him, then he does not believe that Olga loves him. But he does believe that Olga 
loves him. So once again the only way to accommodate this characterization of  
the evidential thesis on beliefs is to consider that James has enough evidence to 
believe that Olga loves him.
In conclusion, these non-normative accounts of  evidentialism for belief  
emergence also present problems. First, and similar to the normative accounts, 
they establish that every available piece of  evidence forms beliefs (iii), but once 
again this problem can be solved if  the amount of  evidence needed for belief  
formation is specified. For that, I reformulate the primitive normative account 
stating that “enough evidence” is needed for belief  emergence (iv). In the next 
section I will specify how much evidence is “enough”. Second, non-normative 
accounts may admit any standard of  correctness for the evaluation of  beliefs. 
So they admit that a false belief  may be correct in non-epistemic terms. What 
they state is that such false belief  necessarily emerges due to evidence. So 
third, and contrary to the normative accounts of  the evidential thesis for belief  
emergence, these constitutive non-normative approaches deny the possibility of  
beliefs following no evidence. For instance, James’ false belief  that Olga loves 
him may be positively judged in terms of  pragmatic standards of  correctness and 
negatively judged in terms of  epistemic standards of  correctness, but James must 
have formed it following defective evidence — but evidence.
4 If  preferred, ‘S believes p only if  there is enough evidence to believe p’ or ‘If  there is not 
enough evidence to believe p, then S does not believe p’. 
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4. a ProPosaL For thE EvidEntiaList thEsis For BELiEF EMErgEnCE: 
 BELiEvErs ConsidEr that thEy havE Enough EvidEnCE 
 For thEir BELiEFs
Finally, I defend that the most plausible approach to characterize the evidentialist 
thesis for belief  emergence derives from (iv): for an agent S and a proposition p, S 
believes p if  and only if  there is enough evidence to believe p.
In that way, I support a constitutive treatment of  evidentialism on beliefs. A 
normative evaluative treatment of  evidentialism may also be stated, but this is far 
from my purposes. I actually admit that non-epistemic standards of  correctness 
may also evaluate beliefs, but a pure and basic evidential approach to belief  must 
be constitutive of  belief. The evidential thesis must be based on the idea that 
evidence is mandatory to form beliefs, even if  these beliefs are false and the 
evidence is defective5.
The problem is now to state how much evidence is sufficient to form beliefs — 
i.e. how much evidence can be considered “enough” for belief  emergence. And 
the solution I propose relies on the believer’s attitude: evidence is enough if  and 
only if  the believer considers it to be enough. More specifically, the reformulation 
I propose to deal with and clarify the evidential thesis for belief  emergence is the 
following one:
(v) For an agent S and a proposition p, S believes p if  and only if  S considers that 
she has enough evidence to believe p.
First, the sufficient condition ‘if  S considers that she has enough evidence to 
believe p, then S believes p’ establishes that the agent develops her beliefs if  she 
considers that there is enough available evidence. Agents do not develop beliefs for 
every available piece of  evidence but they need to consider such pieces enough to 
form beliefs. Second, the necessary condition ‘if  S believes p, then S considers that 
she has enough evidence to believe p’6 refuses any belief  formed without what S 
considers to be enough evidence.
In the James’ love case, this treatment of  the evidential thesis establishes that 
James considers that he has enough evidence to believe that Olga loves him — in 
5 Note that here I do not want to defend evidentialism. I just want to state an accurate defini-
tion and treatment of  the evidentialist thesis. 
6 If  preferred, ‘S believes p only if  S considers that she has enough evidence to believe p’ or ‘if  
S does not consider that she has not enough evidence to believe p, then S does not believe p’. 
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spite of  his friends’ testimonies, in spite of  seeing Olga dating another guy many 
times, in spite of  Olga’s confession that she does not love him-, so then Jimmy 
believes that Olga loves him. What James considers to be enough evidence is weak 
or poor evidence that is likely to be infected by conative facts, but it is still evidence. 
On the contrary, James’ friends develop their belief  that Olga does not love James 
in terms of  what they consider to be more reliable evidence — enough for them. 
If  James considers the evidence provided by his friends to be enough to believe 
that Olga does not love him, then James would believe that Olga does not love him.
Second, if  James does not consider his personal evidence enough to believe 
that Olga loves him, then James would not believe that Olga loves him. But he 
does believe that Olga loves him because he really considers that his personal 
evidence is enough. Similarly, if  James’ friends do not consider their personal 
evidence enough to believe that Olga does not love James, then they would not 
believe that Olga does not love James, but they do because they consider their 
evidence to be enough.
It may be argued that more feasible and suitable evidence must prevail when 
forming beliefs and acting in an opposite manner is just a symptom of  mental 
illness. Nevertheless, wishful thinking and similar beliefs are rather common. As 
previously said, a football team supporter who believes that his team is going to 
win the next match against the best team at present or the mother of  a criminal 
who believes in her son’s innocence are some examples. Lottery players under 
the belief  that they are going to win the lottery with no strong empirical basis are 
frequent. Under a constitutive evidentialist thesis, these agents form their beliefs 
according to some kind of  evidence. I defend that in a broader and accurate 
characterization of  constitutive evidentialism these agents consider their evidence 
to be enough and that is not necessarily a sign of  mental illness. These agents may 
select defective evidence and may consider it to be enough due to non-epistemic 
features — eg. conative or pragmatic issues- but that is not against to what I 
consider the best characterization for a constitutive evidentialist thesis on belief: 
believers always have evidence for their beliefs and they consider such evidence 
to be enough.
5. ConCLusions
After the analysis of  the main normative and non-normative characterizations 
of  the evidentialist thesis for belief  emergence, I finally defend a non-normative 
one based on the idea that the minimum amount of  evidence needed for belief  
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formation is determined by the very believer. In that way, I establish that a 
correct characterization of  evidentialism for belief  formation must not focus on 
the establishment of  epistemic standard of  correctness but it must defend and 
describe the constitutive relationship between the believer, belief  formation and 
evidence. Actually, I am not against the idea that different non-epistemic standard 
of  correctness may judge beliefs and at the same time I admit that epistemic 
standard of  correctness may also judge belief  formation. However, what really 
defines evidentialism is the believer’s commitment to a minimum of  evidence: this 
commitment works as a necessary and sufficient reason for belief  emergence.
It must be noted that here I do not want to defend evidentialism, but just help 
to clarify how we should consider and analyse the evidentialist thesis for belief  
emergence. I do not take a position on the reasons for the emergence of  James’ 
belief  that Olga loves him. I only state that, from an evidentialist position, it must 
be defended that James considers that he has enough evidence to believe that 
Olga loves him.
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